The Microstructure of Foreign Exchange Markets by Richard K. Lyons
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Microstructure of Foreign Exchange Markets
Volume Author/Editor: Jeffrey A. Frankel, Giampaolo Galli, Alberto
Giovannini, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-26000-3
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/fran96-1
Conference Date: July 1-2, 1994
Publication Date: January 1996
Chapter Title: Foreign Exchange Volume: Sound and Fury Signifying
Nothing?
Chapter Author: Richard K. Lyons
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11365
Chapter pages in book: (p. 183 - 208)Foreign Exchange Volume:
Sound and Fury Signifying
Nothing?
Richard K. Lyons
Volume in the spot foreign exchange market dwarfs that in any other financial
market. But is all this trading informative? This paper provides some empirical
evidence. At the broadest level, my results help clarify why trading volume in
this market is extraordinarily high. At a narrower level, I provide some sharp
results regarding the relation between the intensity of trading and the informa-
tiveness of trades.
Specifically, I provide results that discriminate between polar views of trad-
ing intensity, to which I refer as (1) the event-uncertainty view and (2) the hot
potato view. The event-uncertainty view holds that trades are more informative
when trading intensity is high; the hot potato view holds that trades are more
informative when trading intensity is low. In general, theory admits both possi-
bilities, depending primarily on the posited information structure.
To understand the event-uncertainty view—that trades are more informative
when trading intensity is high—consider the work of Easley and O'Hara
(1992). In contrast to earlier models where new information is known to exist,
in Easley and O'Hara (1992) new information may not exist. That is, there is
some probability, say p, of new information and probability (1 — p) of no new
information. In the event of new information, there is some probability, say q,
that an informed trader has received good news and probability (1 — q) of
having received bad news. They demonstrate that, if there is no trade at time t,
then a rational dealer raises the probability that she attaches to the no-
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information event and lowers the probability of news having occurred. Put dif-
ferently, if trading intensity is low, an incoming trade of a given size induces a
smaller update in beliefs since it is less likely to be signaling news. On the flip
side, trades occurring when intensity is high should induce a larger update
in beliefs.
To understand the term the hot potato view—that trades are more informa-
tive when trading intensity is low—consider the ideas of Admati and Pfleiderer
(1988). Key to their model is the presence of discretionary liquidity traders: in
order to minimize their losses to informed traders, rational liquidity traders
clump together in their trading. (The reason that informed traders cannot fully
offset this advantage to clumping is that information is short-lived.) Owing to
this clumping of liquidity traders, trades occurring when intensity is high tend
to be less informative.
The metaphor of the hot potato offers a link between this discretionary li-
quidity trading and foreign exchange trading. Foreign exchange dealers use
the metaphor in referring to the repeated passage of idiosyncratic inventory
imbalances from dealer to dealer following an innovation in customer order
flow. These interdealer liquidity trades are clearly discretionary as to timing—
hence the connection between discretionary liquidity trading and the hot potato
view of order-flow information. To clarify the hot potato process, consider the
following crude but not unrealistic example. (Keep in mind that roughly 85
percent of foreign exchange trading is interdealer, a much higher share than in
other multiple-dealer markets.) Suppose that there are ten dealers, all of whom
are risk averse, and each currently with a zero net position. A customer sale of
$10 million worth of deutsche marks is accommodated by one of the dealers.
Not wanting to carry the open position, the dealer calculates his share of this
inventory imbalance—or one-tenth of $10 million—calls another dealer, and
unloads $9 million worth of deutsche marks. The dealer receiving this trade
then calculates his share of this inventory imbalance—or one tenth of $9 mil-
lion—calls another dealer, and unloads $8.1 million worth of deutsche marks.
The hot potato process continues. In the limit, the total interdealer volume
generated from the $10 million customer trade is $9 million /(I — 0.9) = $90
million. Thus, the example produces an interdealer share of 90 percent,
roughly matching the empirical share.
Here are two possible reactions to the example given above, neither of which
vitiates its message, (a) Shouldn't the multiplier be infinite since risk-averse
dealers would not choose to retain any of the imbalance? The answer is that,
in equilibrium, price will adjust to induce dealers to hold some of the perceived
excess supply. The 10 percent rule of the example is a crude approximation of
a much richer short-run clearing mechanism.
1 (b) Interdealer trades can reduce
idiosyncratic inventory imbalances—which reduces idiosyncratic risk rather
1. For an optimizing model in which hot potato trading arises between dealers, see Lyons
(1995a). Flood (1992) examines simulation experiments that allow for hot potato trading.185 Foreign Exchange Volume
than simply bouncing it—and this will mute the multiplier. This is true, partic-
ularly if the trades are brokered. It is therefore more reasonable to think about
the example in terms of net customer orders rather than gross.
The role of time in the empirical microstructure literature has only recently
emerged. Two important contributions are Hasbrouck (1991) and Hausman,
Lo, and MacKinlay (1992). Hasbrouck decomposes the variance of stock price
changes into trade-correlated and trade-uncorrelated components and finds
that trades are more informative at the beginning of the trading day. Also work-
ing with stocks, Hausman et al. test for exogeneity of the length of time be-
tween transactions, which they reject at conventional significance levels. How-
ever, they argue that their estimates do not change when endogeneity is
addressed using instrumental variables. On the basis of this, they forge ahead
with the assumption of exogenous intertransaction times.
Empirical microstructure work in foreign exchange has been constrained
until recently by a lack of transaction-level data. The paper most closely related
to the analysis here is Lyons (1995b), which uses a transactions data set that is
a subset of the data used here (namely, it uses dealt quotes only). That paper
presents evidence supporting both of the two branches of microstructure the-
ory: the asymmetric-information branch and the inventory-control branch. Al-
though many papers have provided evidence supporting the asymmetric-
information branch, little or no direct evidence had previously been found in
support of the inventory-control branch (see, e.g., Madhavan and Smidt 1991;
Manaster and Mann 1993; and the overview in O'Hara 1995). The fact that
they are both present provides further impetus for the application of micro-
structural models to the foreign exchange market. The application here extends
previous work by addressing the informational subtleties of order flow.
The chapter is organized as follows: section 5.1 presents a model of transac-
tion prices that includes a relation between trading intensity and the informa-
tion content of trades; section 5.2 describes the data; section 5.3 presents the
results; and section 5.4 concludes.
5.1 A Model in Which Time Matters
The following model extends the model of Madhavan and Smidt (1991) by
incorporating a role for intertransaction time. As they do, I will exploit the
model's ability to disentangle the information effects of trades from the
inventory-control effects. The result is a richer characterization of the effect of
trades on price.
There are two assets in a pure exchange economy: one riskless (the numer-
aire) and one with a stochastic liquidation value (representing foreign ex-
change). The foreign exchange market is organized as a decentralized dealer-
ship market with n dealers. Here, we focus on the pricing behavior of a
representative dealer, denoted dealer i. A period is defined by a transaction
effected against dealer i's quote, with periods running from t — 1, 2, .. . , T.186 Richard K. Lyons
Signal St
Receive Observe
Signal C. Quote P Trade Q
Fig. 5.1 Sequencing in each period
Note: S, is a public signal of the full information value Vr; Cjt is dealer j's private signal of Vr,
where j denotes the dealer requesting the quote from dealer i; Pit is dealer i's bilateral quote to
dealer j, a schedule matching each transaction quantity with a price; QJt is the signed quantity
traded, positive for dealer j's purchases, negative for sales; and r, is the period t increment to Vr
Let dealer j denote the dealer requesting dealer i's quote in any period. Figure
5.1 summarizes the timing in each period.
5.1.1 The Information Environment
The full information price of foreign exchange at time T is denoted by V,
which is composed of a series of increments—for example, interest differen-
tials—so that V = Xf=0 ?i, where r0 is a known constant. The increments are
i.i.d. mean zero. Each increment rt is realized immediately after trading in pe-
riod t. Realizations of the increments can be thought to represent the flow of
public information over time. The value of foreign exchange at t is thus defined
as Vt — Xj=0
 rr At the time of quoting and trading in period t, that is, before f,
is realized, Vt is a random variable. In a market without private information or
transaction costs, the quoted price of foreign exchange at time t, denoted Pt,
would be equal to V,_,, which is the expected value of the asset price condi-
tional on public information available at t.
The following two signals define each period's information environment
prior to dealer i's quote to dealer j:
(1) S, = V, + fj,,
(2) Cj, = Vt + <bjt,
where the noise terms r\t and oo^ are normally distributed about zero, are inde-
pendent of one another and across periods, and have variances o^ and u
2w, re-
spectively. At the outset of each period t, all dealers receive a public signal S,
of the full-information value V,. Also at the outset of each period t, dealer j—
the dealer requesting a quote—receives a private signal Cjt of Vt. In the foreign
exchange market, one potential source of private signals at the dealer level is
order flow from nondealer customers; because each dealer has sole knowledge
of his own-customer order flow, to the extent that this flow conveys information
it is private information, which can be exploited in interdealer trading (see,
e.g., Goodhart 1988, 456; and Lyons 1995a).187 Foreign Exchange Volume
Dealer i conditions on St and then quotes his schedule as a function of pos-
sible Qjt. The schedule's sensitivity to Qjt ensures that any realization of QJt will
be regret free for the quoting dealer, in the sense of Glosten and Milgrom
(1985). That is, the quote takes account of the adverse selection arising from
dealer j's additional information Cjt. Of course, the realization of Qjt still pro-
vides dealer i a signal of Cjt. As is standard, the signed quantity that dealer j
chooses to trade is linearly related to the deviation between dealer j's expecta-
tion and the transaction price, plus a quantity representing liquidity demand Xjt
that is uncorrelated with Vt:
where ix^ is the expectation of Vr conditional on information available to dealer
j at t, and the value of Xjt is known only to dealer j. (The demand function that
supports eq. [3] requires either exponential utility defined over a single period
or mean-variance optimization over multiple periods.)
I introduce a role for time in the model via equation (3) and the liquidity
demand Xjt. The hot potato hypothesis of order-flow information associates
liquidity demand XJt with inventory-adjustment trading. In foreign exchange—
according to the hypothesis—innovations in nondealer order flow spark re-
peated interdealer trading of idiosyncratic inventory imbalances. This rapid
passing of the hot potato generates a relatively large role for liquidity trades in
periods of short intertransaction times. The event-uncertainty hypothesis, in
contrast, associates short intertransaction times with a relatively large role for
informative trading: in the presence of event uncertainty, intense trading is a
signal that an information event has occurred. To summarize, for given preci-
sions of the signals Cjt and St, we can characterize these views as follows:
Hot potato hypothesis:
{
high when intertransaction times are short;
low when intertransaction times are long.
Event-uncertainty hypothesis:
low when intertransaction times are short;
high when intertransaction times are long.
This change in the relative intensity of liquidity trading will alter the signal
extraction problem faced by the quoting dealer, to which we now turn.
5.1.2 The Formation of Expectations
Dealer i's quotes depend on his conditional expectation of V, at the time of
quoting, which I denote |xlV. This expectation, in turn, is a function of the vari-
ables described above: Sr and Qjr; the third variable described above, Cjr, is
communicated (noisily) to dealer i via Qjt.188 Richard K. Lyons
I now address the determination of this expectation |x.,. Dealer i's prior belief
regarding V, is summarized by the public signal St. Dealer i then considers the
"what if" of various possible Qjt's. In particular, from any Q.t dealer i can form
the statistic Zjt (see the appendix):





where X = O"^/(CT^ + CT^). This statistic is normally distributed, with mean Vt
and variance equal to the variance of the last two terms, both of which are
orthogonal to Vt. Via Xjr, the variance of the second of these two terms is a
function of intertransaction times, per above. Let cr^ denote the variance of the
statistic Zjt when intertransaction times are short, and let a
2zl denote the variance
of Z.t when intertransaction times are long.
Since Zjt is statistically independent of St, dealer i's posterior |i.,, expressed
as a function of any Qjr, takes the form of a weighted average of S, and Zjt:
(5) JJL., = KkSt + (1 - Kt)Z.,, k = s,l,
where K5 = (^/(cxl, + a
2), and K; = o-|;/(cr|; + tr*). This expectation plays a
central role in determining dealer i's quote. Note that K^ > K, if <J
2ZS > a
2zl, that
is, if liquidity trading is relatively important when intertransaction times are
short.
5.1.3 The Determination of Bid/Offer Quotes
Consider the following prototypical inventory-control model. Here, the
transaction price is linearly related to the dealer's current inventory—a speci-
fication that is optimal in a number of inventory control models:
(6) Plt = M* - <h ~ O + 7A .
where \x.it is the expectation of Vr conditional on information available to dealer
i at t, /rr is dealer i's current inventory position, and /* is i's desired position.
The inventory-control effect, governed by a, will in general be a function of
relative interest rates, firm capital, and carrying costs. The variable Dt is a
direction-indicator variable with a value of 1 when a buyer-initiated trade oc-
curs and a value of — 1 when a seller-initiated trade occurs. Thus, the term yDt
picks up (half) the baseline spread: if dealer j is a buyer, then the realized
transaction price P.t will be on the offer side and therefore a little higher, ceteris
paribus. (To be precise, yDt picks up half the spread for trade quantities ap-
proaching zero, i.e., for which there is no adverse selection effect on |x,,.) This
term can be interpreted as compensation resulting from execution costs, price
discreteness, or rents.
Consistent with the regret-free property of quotes, I substitute dealer i's ex-
pectation conditional on possible Qjt's—equation (5)—into equation (6),
yielding:189 Foreign Exchange Volume
(7) Pit = KkS, + (1 - Kk)ZJt - a(/
which is equivalent to (see the appendix)
where 4>, = (Kk - X)/(l - X) and 0 < <J>t < 1 since 0 < Kt < 1, 0 < X < 1,
and K^. > \.
5.1.4 An Estimable Equation
Equation (8) is not directly estimable because 5, is not observable to the
econometrician. My assumptions about the signals available and the evolution
of V, allow me to express the period / prior 5, as equal to the period t - 1
posterior from equation (6) lagged one period, plus an expectational error
term eit:
(9) S, = *!„_, + e, = />,_, + <*(/_, - /*) - -YA-I + e,.
Substituting this expression for St into equation (8) yields
which implies:
This corresponds to a reduced-form estimating equation of
(11) APit = 30 + P,G7, + P2/ft + P34-! + EW + P5A-, + B, . Thus, the change in the transaction price from t — 1 to Ms linearly related to
(i) the signed incoming order at t, (ii) the inventory level at t, (iii) the inventory
level at t — 1, (iv) whether Pit is at the bid or the offer, and (v) whether Pit_x is
at the bid or the offer. Note that the last two regressors—the indicator variables
Dt and Dr_,—are accounting for bid-offer bounce. The model predicts that
(PP (33, 3J > 0, {(32, pj < 0, jp2| > p3, and p4 > |P5|, irrespective of the intertransaction time. (The latter inequalities derive from the fact that 0 < §k
< 1.) These more general predictions are borne out in the data and are pre-
sented in Lyons (1995b). Here, the focus is on the information in order flow
measured by (3,, which in turn is a function of the structural parameter K from
equation (5). That is, I want to test whether the coefficient P, is sensitive to190 Richard K. Lyons
intertransaction time and, if so, in which direction. The hot potato hypothesis
predicts a lower (3j when intertransaction times are short; the event-uncertainty
hypothesis predicts a higher p, when intertransaction times are short. These
predictions derive from the relative importance of liquidity trading (cr
2Xj) in the
signal extraction problem.
My final comment on the model concerns the assumption of a time-invariant
desired inventory. First, note that with a slight reinterpretation the model can
accommodate variability in desired inventories, that is, an /* that varies through
time. Consider the model /* = /( + 8(|x,, - S), which is consistent with the
linear demands arising from negative exponential utility, where the public in-
formation St represents the market price away from dealer i. Further, Qjt is
the only information available to dealer i that is not reflected in St. Under the
assumptions of my model, (|JL(/ - St) is proportional to Qjt. Accordingly, I write
(|xl7 — S) — TrQjt. Hence, I can express the desired inventory as /* = 7; +
8ir<2/f. In estimation, /. is absorbed in the constant. The estimate of P, now rep-
resents
whose significance still evinces an information effect, although I have to be
more careful in interpreting its magnitude.
5.2 Data
My data set has significant advantages over foreign exchange data used in
the past, in particular, Reuters FXFX indications data (see, e.g., Goodhart
1989; and Bollerslev and Domowitz 1993). The main shortcomings of the Reu-
ters indications are three: first, these are only indications, not firm quotes at
which dealers can transact; second, there is no measure of order flow or trans-
action prices; and, third, the spreads in the indications data set are two to three
times the size of firm quotes in the interdealer market.
My data set consists of two linked components, covering the five trading
days of the week 3-7 August 1992, from the informal start of trading at 8:30
EST to roughly 1:30 EST. The first component includes the time-stamped
quotes, prices, and quantities for all the direct interdealer transactions of a
single deutsche mark/dollar dealer at a major New York bank. The second
component comprises the same dealer's position cards, which includes all indi-
rect (brokered) trades.
5.2.1 Dealer Data: Direct Quotes and Trades
The first component of the data set includes the dealer's quotes, prices, and
quantities for all direct transactions. The availability of this component is due191 Foreign Exchange Volume
to a recent change in technology in this market: the Reuters Dealing 2000-1
system. This system—very different from the system that produces the Reuters
indications—allows dealers to communicate quotes and trades bilaterally via
computer rather than verbally over the telephone.
2 Among other things, this
allows dealers to request up to four quotes simultaneously, whereas phone re-
quests are necessarily sequential. Another advantage is that the computerized
documentation reduces the paperwork required of the dealers. Although use of
this technology differs by dealer and is currently diffusing more widely, this
dealer uses Dealing 2000-1 for nearly all his direct interbank trades: less than
0.4 percent of all transactions were conducted over the phone over my sample
week (as indicated on the position cards).
Each record of the data covering the dealer's direct trading includes the first
five of the following seven variables; the last two are included only if a trade
takes place:
1. The time the communication is initiated (to the minute, with no lag).
2. Which of the two dealers is requesting the quote.
3. The quote quantity.
4. The bid quote.
5. The offer quote.
6. The quantity traded (which provides Qjr).
7. The transaction price (which provides Pir).
This component of the data set includes 952 transactions amounting to $4.1
billion.
Figure 5.2 provides an example of a dealer communication as recorded by
the Dealing 2000-1 printout (for more details, see Reuters [1990]). The first
word indicates that the call came "From" another dealer. Then comes the insti-
tution code and name of the counterparty, followed by the time (Greenwich
Mean, computer assigned), the date (day first), and the number assigned to the
communication. On line 3, "SP DMK 10" identifies this as a request for a spot
deutsche mark/dollar quote for up to $10 million. Line 4 provides the quoted
bid and offer price: typically, dealers quote only the last two digits of each
price, the rest being superfluous in such a fast-moving market. These two
quotes correspond to a bid of 1.58S8 deutsche marks/dollars and an offer of
1.5897 deutsche marks/dollars. In confirming the transaction, the communica-
tion record provides the first three digits. Here, the calling dealer buys $10
million at the deutsche mark offer price of 1.5891. The record confirms the
exact price and quantity. In the current data set, transactions never take place
within the spread; the transaction price always equals either the bid or the offer.
2. Dealing 2000-1 is also very different than Dealing 2000-2. The former is wholly bilateral,
while the latter is akin to an electronic broker, where multiple dealers participate. See Goodhart,
Ito, and Payne, chap. 4 in this volume.192 Richard K. Lyons
From CODE FULL NAME HERE * 1250GMT 030892 */1080




# 10 MIO AGREED
# VAL6AUG92
# MY DMK TO FULL NAME HERE
# TO CONFIRM AT 1.5891 I SELL 10 MIO USD
#
TO CONFIRM AT 1.58911 SELL 10 MIO USD
VAL 6AUG92





" ## WRAP UP BY DMK DMK 1250GMT 3AUG92
" #END#
( 265 CHARS)
Fig. 5.2 Example of a Reuters Dealing 2000-1 communication
Note: "From" establishes this as an incoming call; the caller's four-digit code and institution name
follow; "GMT" denotes Greenwich Mean Time; the date follows, with the day listed first; "SP
DMK 10" identifies this as request for a spot, deutsche mark/dollar quote for up to $10 million;
"8891" denotes a bid of 88 and an offer of 91 (only the last two digits are quoted); the confirmation
provides the complete transaction price and verifies the transaction quantity; "THKS N BIFN" is
shorthand for "thanks and bye for now."
5.2.2 Dealer Data: Position Cards
The second component of the data set is composed of the dealer's position
cards over the same five days covered by the direct-transaction data, 3-7 Au-
gust 1992. In order to track their positions, spot dealers record all transactions
on handwritten position cards as they go along. An average day consists of
approximately twenty cards, each with about fifteen transaction entries.
There are two key benefits to this component of the data set. First, it provides
a very clean measure of the dealer's inventory Ir at any time since it includes
both direct trades and any brokered trades. Second, it provides a means of error
checking the first component of the data set.
Each card includes the following information for every trade:
1. The signed quantity traded (which determines /,).
2. The transaction price.
3. The counterparty, including whether brokered.
Note that the bid/offer quotes at the time of the transaction are not included,
so this component of the data set alone is not sufficient for estimating the
model. Note also that each entry is not time-stamped; at the outset of every
card, and often within the card too, the dealer records the time to the minute.
Hence, the exact timing of some of the brokered transactions is not pinned193 Foreign Exchange Volume
down since these trades do not get confirmed via a Dealing 2000-1 record.
Nevertheless, this is not a drawback for my purposes: the observations for the
empirical model are the direct transactions initiated at the dealer's quoted
prices; since the timing of these is pinned down by the Dealing 2000-1 records,
and since these transactions appear sequentially in both components, the in-
tervening changes in inventory due to brokered trades can be determined
exactly.
5.2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 5.1 presents the data in the form of daily averages to convey a sense
of the typical day's activity. This is masking some daily variation in the sample:
the heaviest day (Friday, 7 August) is a little less than twice as active as the
lightest day (Wednesday, 5 August). Note that this dealer averages well over $1
Table 5.1 Overview Statistics, 3-7 August 1992
1. Average number of transactions daily:
a) Incoming
b) Outgoing
2. Average value of transactions daily:"
a) Incoming
b) Outgoing




4. Average number of quotes daily:
a) Made
b) Received































Note: Data for the dealer's direct (interdealer) quotes and transactions are from the Reuters Dealing
2000-1 communications. Incoming refers to transactions initiated by another dealer; outgoing re-
fers to transactions initiated by my dealer. Made refers to quotes made by my dealer; received
refers to quotes received by my dealer. The trades in these two columns reflect more than 95
percent of this dealer's trading; the trades that make up the remainder are executed either (i) over
the phone, (ii) with a nondealer customer, or (iii) in the futures market (IMM). Data for the dealer's
brokered transactions are from the dealer's position sheets; it is not possible to identify the aggres-
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billion of interdealer trading daily (brokered trades are necessarily interdealer).
With respect to quoting, because this dealer is among the larger in this market,
he has $10 million "relationships" with many other dealers; that is, quote re-
quests from other high-volume dealers that do not specify a quantity are under-
stood to be good for up to $10 million. Note the tightness of the median spread.
For comparison, the median spread in the Reuters indications data set is two
to three times as large. A bid/offer spread of three pips is less than 0.02 percent
of the spot price.
A natural concern is whether this dealer is representative of the larger deal-
ers in the spot market. While I cannot answer this definitively, I offer a few
relevant facts. First, he has been trading in this market for many years and is
well known among the other major dealers. Second, in terms of trading vol-
ume, he is without a doubt one of the key players, trading well over $1 billion
per day and maintaining $10 million quote relationships with a number of other
dealers. Although this would probably not put him in the top five in terms of
volume, he is not far back, possibly in the fifth to fifteenth range somewhere.
In the end, my view is that he is representative, at least with respect to the
issues addressed here. There is no doubt, however, that different trading
styles exist.
5.2.4 Relevant Institutional Background
Here, I highlight two institutional factors relevant to my analysis: (i) trading
limits imposed on dealers and (ii) trading on the International Money Market
(IMM) futures market. As for trading limits, there is an important distinction
between intraday limits and overnight limits. At my dealer's bank, which is
typical of major banks, there are no explicit intraday limits on senior dealers,
although dealers are expected to communicate particularly large trades to their
immediate supervisor (about $50 million and above for many banks in the
current deutsche mark/dollar market). In contrast, most banks impose over-
night limits on their dealers. Currently, a common overnight limit on a single
dealer's open position is about $75 million, considerably larger than the largest
open position in my sample. Most dealers, however, close their day with a zero
net position; carrying an open position means monitoring it through the eve-
ning, an unattractive prospect after a full day of trading. My dealer ended his
day with a zero net position each of the five days in the sample. Finally, al-
though broader risk-management programs are in place at the bank for which
my dealer trades, it is rare in foreign exchange that a dealer's position is hedged
because it aggregates unfavorably with others; when this does occur, it is typi-
cally without the participation of the individual dealer.
As for trading on the IMM futures market while dealing spot, this differs by
dealer. I stress, however, that, unlike equity markets, the spot foreign exchange
market is many times larger than the futures market: in 1992 the average daily
volume in New York in spot deutsche mark/dollar was roughly $50 billion
(New York Federal Reserve Bank [1992], adjusted for double counting); in the195 Foreign Exchange Volume
same year, the average daily volume on all IMM deutsche mark/dollar con-
tracts was less than $5 billion. As for my dealer, his position cards show that
he traded less than $1 million daily in futures over the sample period, which is
negligible relative to his daily spot volume. Like other spot dealers, he does
listen to an intercom that communicates futures prices. However, this intercom
is less important to a spot dealer than the intercoms connected to interdealer
brokers in the spot market.
5.3 Estimation Results
I begin with results from direct estimation of the model in equation (11),
which are presented in table 5.2. Although these estimates do not include any
role for intertransaction time, they provide a benchmark for the later results
regarding the hot potato and event-uncertainty hypotheses. Note that these esti-
mates are essentially a replication of a result presented in Lyons (1995b). Ac-
cordingly, I refer readers to that earlier work for more detailed interpretation.
Given these benchmark results, henceforth I present only those coefficients
that bear on the information content of order flow—namely, variations of (3j
from equation (11). All nonreported coefficients remain significant at at least
the 5 percent level, with the predicted signs and relative magnitudes. Pres-
enting the results this way allows me to focus on the informational subtleties
outlined in section 5.1.
5.3.1 The Core Model of Trading Intensity
Table 5.3 presents my estimates of the information content of order flow,
distinguishing between short and long intertransaction times. This is achieved
via the introduction of dummy variables st and /, (see the equation heading the
table). The dummy sr equals 1 if intertransaction time is short, 0 otherwise; the


































Note: ^-statistics are given in parentheses. APifis the change in the transaction price (DM/$) from
t - 1 to t. Q,,is the dollar quantity transacted directly at dealer i's quoted prices, positive for buyer-
initiated trades (i.e., effected at the offer) and negative for seller-initiated trades (at the bid). /, is
i's position at the end of period t. Dt is an indicator variable with the value 1 if the trade is buyer
initiated and the value -1 if seller initiated. The units of Qjt, Iit, and /if_, are such that a coefficient
of unity implies a price effect of DM 0.0001 for every $10 million. The units of the indicator
variable D,_l are such that a coefficient of 10 implies DM 0.0002/$ between bid and offer at
quantity zero. Estimated using OLS, with heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent (first-
order) standard errors. Sample: 3-7 August 1992, 842 observations.196 Richard K. Lyons
Table 5.3 Is Order Flow Less Informative When Intertransaction
Time Is Short?
AP, = p0 + PAQ,, + p;/,e,, + VJU + iv,,-, + p4o, + p
p
Intertransaction time short if:
Less than 1 minute


















Note: ^-statistics are given in parentheses. The coefficient p, measures the information effect of
trades for which the time from the previous transaction is short (st = 1 and /, = 0 in the equation
in the heading), where short is defined in the first column. The coefficient PJ measures the infor-
mation effect of those trades for which the time from the previous transaction is long (st = 0, /, =
1), where long is defined as not short. The "Fraction Short" column presents the fraction of obser-
vations satisfying the corresponding definition of short intertransaction times. In each case, the
remaining observations fall into the long category. The P-value column presents the significance
level at which the null p, = p[ can just be rejected. AP,.,is the change in the transaction price
(DM/$) from t — 1 to t. QJt is the dollar quantity transacted directly at dealer i's quoted prices,
positive for buyer-initiated trades (i.e., effected at the offer) and negative for seller-initiated trades
(at the bid). The units of Q^,are such that p, = 1 implies a price effect of DM 0.0001 for every
$10 million. /, is i's position at the end of period t. Dt is an indicator variable with the value 1 if
the trade is buyer initiated and the value — 1 if seller initiated. Estimated using OLS, with hetero-
skedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent (first-order) standard errors. Sample: 3-7 August
1992, 842 observations.
transaction times are defined two ways: less than one minute from the previous
transaction and less than two minutes. The time-stamps on the data are very
precise since they are assigned by the computer; however, they do not provide
precision beyond the minute. Hence, less than one minute includes trades with
the same time-stamp; less than two minutes includes trades with time-stamps
differing by one minute or less. These categories bracket the mean intertransac-
tion time of 1.8 minutes. The second category corresponds to a break at the
median intertransaction time.
The results provide strong support for the hot potato hypothesis over the
event-uncertainty hypothesis. The coefficient (3,—which measures the infor-
mation effect of incoming trades with short intertransaction times—is insig-
nificant at conventional levels. In contrast, the coefficient (3{—which measures
the information effect of incoming trades with long intertransaction times—is
significant. Moreover, a test of the restriction that (3, = (3[ is rejected at the 1
percent level in both cases. In summary, trades occurring when transaction
intensity is high are significantly less informative than trades occurring when
transaction intensity is low. This is the main result of the paper.
5.3.2 The Pattern of the Market
There is an additional testable implication of the hot potato hypothesis: it
follows directly from the story of bouncing inventories outlined above that197 Foreign Exchange Volume
these discretionary liquidity trades will tend to be in the same direction (i.e.,
have the same sign). The obverse is that clumped trading is more likely to be
hot potato (liquidity) trading if trades follow in the same direction. The impli-
cation for prices is that, even if martingales, they are not necessarily Markov.
The test presented in table 5.4 addresses the question, Is clumped order flow
less informative when transactions follow the same direction? Again, I intro-
duce dummy variables, in this case st, ot, and /, (see the equation heading the
table). The dummy st equals 1 if (i) intertransaction time is short and (ii) the
previous incoming trade has the same direction, 0 otherwise; the dummy ot
equals 1 if (i) intertransaction time is short and (ii) the previous incoming trade
has the opposite direction, 0 otherwise; the dummy /, equals 0 if intertransac-
tion time is short, 1 otherwise. A short intertransaction time is defined as less
than the median of two minutes.
Once again, the results support the hot potato hypothesis. The coefficient
P,—short intertransaction times and same direction—is insignificant. In con-
trast, the coefficient (3{—short intertransaction times and opposite direction—
is significant. A test of the restriction that (3, = P[ is rejected at the 1 percent
level. To summarize, clumped trades occurring in the same direction are sig-
nificantly less informative than clumped trades occurring in the opposite
direction.






















Note: f-statistics are given in parentheses. The coefficient (3, measures the information effect of
trades that (i) have short intertransaction times, defined as less than the median of two minutes,
and (ii) have the same direction as the previous trade (st = 1,0, = 0, and lt = 0 in the equation in
the heading). The coefficient (3,' measures the information effect of trades that (i) have short inter-
transaction times, defined as less than the median of two minutes, and (ii) have the opposite direc-
tion of the previous trade (st = 0, o, = 1, /, = 0). The coefficient [3" measures the information
effect of trades that have long intertransaction times, defined as greater than or equal to the median
of two minutes (s, = 0, o, = 0, I, — 1). The "Fraction Short and Same" column presents the
fraction of observations satisfying the corresponding definition of short and same (similarly for
the "Fraction Short and Opposite" column). The remaining 336/842 observations fall into the long
category. The P-value column presents the significance level at which the null (3, = (3[ can just be
rejected. AP;,is the change in the transaction price (DM/$) from t — Itot. Qjt is the dollar quantity
transacted directly at dealer i's quoted prices, positive for buyer-initiated trades (i.e., effected at
the offer) and negative for seller-initiated trades (at the bid). The units of Qjt are such that P, = 1
implies a price effect of DM 0.0001 for every $10 million. /, is i's position at the end of period t.
Dt is an indicator variable with the value 1 if the trade is buyer initiated and the value — 1 if seller
initiated. Estimated using OLS, with heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent (first-
order) standard errors. Sample: 3-7 August 1992, 842 observations.198 Richard K. Lyons
5.3.3 Another Measure of Market Pace: Quote Intensity
The results of table 5.4 highlight another important observation: although
the hot potato and event-uncertainty hypotheses make opposite predictions re-
garding the relation between information and trading intensity, they are not
necessarily competing hypotheses. That is, both effects could be operative: hot
potato trading simply dominates when trading is most intense in this market.
To examine whether there is independent support for event uncertainty, I
exploit an "instrument" that is arguably more closely related to event uncer-
tainty than inventory control. To understand this instrument, recognize that in
Easley and O'Hara (1992) transaction intensity per se is the only dimension of
trading intensity available for signaling the underlying state. The problem for
our purposes is that transaction intensity is also the linchpin of the hot potato
model. My data set, on the other hand, includes a second dimension of trading
intensity: quoting intensity. The roughly 4:1 ratio of not-dealt quotes to dealt
quotes in table 5.1 above indicates that transactions alone may not be telling
the full story. More important for discriminating event uncertainty from hot
potato is the fact that quote requests per se typically signal heightened uncer-
tainty and information gathering, whereas hot potato transactions minimize on
quote requests in order to unload inventory rapidly. In short, quoting intensity
provides another vehicle for Easley and O'Hara.
Table 5.5 presents estimates of the information content of order flow, distin-
guishing between high and low quoting intensity as a measure of market pace.
Once again I introduce dummy variables, in this case ht and /, (see the equation
heading the table). The dummy hr equals 1 if the total number of intervening
quotes per minute is high, 0 otherwise; the dummy /, equals 0 if the total num-
ber of intervening quotes per minute is high, 1 otherwise. The different defini-
tions of a high number of intervening quotes appear in the far-left-hand col-
umn. These quotes are from the Dealing 2000-1 portion of the data set,
described in section 5.2.1.
These results provide support for the event-uncertainty hypothesis. The co-
efficient 3, reflecting high quoting intensity is significant, whereas the coeffi-
cient (3[ reflecting low quoting intensity is insignificant. A test of the restriction
that p, = PI is rejected at the 5 percent level in all three cases. To summarize,
trades occurring when quoting intensity is high are significantly more informa-
tive than trades occurring when quoting intensity is low.
5.4 Conclusions
Our results suggest that, in foreign exchange, trading begets trading. The
trading begotten is relatively uninformative, arising from repeated passage of
inventory imbalances among dealers. Clearly, this could not arise under a spe-
cialist microstructure. A broad implication is that a microstructural understand-199 Foreign Exchange Volume
Table 5.5 Is Order-Flow More Informative When Quoting Intensity Is High?
APU = p0 + PAS,, + p;/,e,, + PA_, + p4z>, + p5z>,_i + e,,
Quoting intensity high if:
> 3 intervening quotes per minute
> 4 intervening quotes per minute























Note: ^-statistics are given in parentheses. The coefficient p, measures the information effect of
those trades occurring when quoting intensity is high (ht = 1, /, = 0), where high intensity is
defined in the first column by the total number of quotes—both made and received—since the
previous incoming transaction. The coefficient [3j measures the information effect of those trades
occurring when quoting intensity is low (hf = 0, lt = 1), where low intensity is defined as not high.
The "Fraction High" column presents the fraction of observations satisfying the corresponding
definition of high-intensity quoting. The P-value column presents the significance level at which
the null (3, = fj| can just be rejected. AP,., is the change in the transaction price (DM/$) from t -
1 to t. Qjt is the dollar quantity transacted directly at dealer i's quoted prices, positive for buyer-
initiated trades (i.e., effected at the offer) and negative for seller-initiated trades (at the bid). The
units of (?,,are such that (3, = 1 implies a price effect of DM 0.0001 for every $10 million. /, is i's
position at the end of period /. Dt is an indicator variable with the value 1 if the trade is buyer
initiated and the value —1 if seller initiated. Estimated using OLS, with heteroske-
dasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent (first-order) standard errors. Sample: 3-7 August 1992,
842 observations.
ing of this market requires much richer multiple-dealer theory than now exists
(see, e.g., Ho and Stoll 1983).
My principal empirical findings are the following:
1. Trades occurring when transaction intensity is high are significantly less
informative than trades occurring when transaction intensity is low.
2. Clumped trades occurring in the same direction are significantly less in-
formative than clumped trades occurring in the opposite direction.
3. Trades occurring when quoting intensity is high are significantly more
informative than trades occurring when quoting intensity is low.
I interpret the first two results as supportive of hot potato trading among dealers
in foreign exchange. I interpret the third result as supportive of the Easley and
O'Hara event-uncertainty hypothesis, although the vehicle differs from the
transaction focus of their paper. Taken together, the results highlight the poten-
tial complementarity between these seemingly polar views.
There is an important hardship in focusing on a dealership market like for-
eign exchange that warrants recognition. Empirical work on the specialist
structure has the luxury of describing the behavior of a lone dealer. It is much
more difficult to argue that by documenting the behavior of a single dealer in
the foreign exchange market I have similarly captured the foreign exchange200 Richard K. Lyons
market. The data required to generate a more complete picture are out of the
question given current availability. Nevertheless, the dealer whom I have
tracked is without a doubt one of the key players in this market, trading well
over $1 billion per day and maintaining $10 million quote relationships with a
number of other dealers. Is he representative of dealers in the core of the
wholesale spot market? I would argue yes, at least with respect to the issues
addressed here. But there is no doubt that different dealers have different trad-
ing styles.
Appendix
Derivation of the Statistic Z;, in Equation (4)
Beginning with equation (3),
(3) Qjt = 9(^., - />,.,) + Xj,
=> <ye + p, - H + x.,/e
=> G,/6 + Pit = XSr + (1 - X)C., + X.,/6, where X - </(^ + <),
=> (ye + P,, - AS, = (1 - X)(V, + &J + Xjr/Q, since Cfi =V, + w.,,
(4) =» Zjt - ^
/U, '; ^
f = V, + &j, + [1/6(1 - k)]Xjt.
1 — \
Derivation of the Price Representation in Equation (8)
Beginning with equation (6),
(6) Pu = \LU ~ a(/, - /*) + yDt,
I can write (where Kk = ^/[(j^ + cr^], k = s, I):
fx, = K& + (1 - Kk)Zjt
*i i f\ i X(l - Kk
1 - X
f it I' > '
* I \ £/ I i I * ' ""t I -i
since |K, -*-\ + -*| = 1.
1 ~ X J LI X.201 Foreign Exchange Volume
Note also that 0 < <J>fc < 1 since 0 < K^ < 1, 0 < X < 1, and K^ > X for both
k = s and k — I. Each of these properties follows from the definitions of Kk and
X and the fact that o*. = a
2 + [6(1 - X)]~
2a
2.
Substituting this expression for |x.f into equation (6) yields
/ \
(8) P.t = <$>kSt + (1 - 4>,) Q/Q + Pit) - a(Iit - I*) + yDr
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Comment Mark D. Flood
A comment on Richard Lyons's paper must begin with mention of its data.
Lyons has assembled a data set with a level of detail that is unusual in micro-
structural studies and unprecedented in studies of foreign exchange market
microstructure. For the first time, we have an essentially complete and suffi-
ciently long (one-week) time series of quoted spreads (both direct and brok-
ered) and transaction prices for a foreign exchange marketmaker. It should be
emphasized that even the untransacted prices in this data set are live quotes—
and not the indicative prices (such as those collected by Charles Goodhart)
that heretofore represented the best intradaily data set available to researchers.
Moreover, the data set also includes the quantity of all transactions and the
marketmaker's inventory position, with everything time-stamped to the minute.
We thus have contemporaneous measurement of all main aspects of a mar-
ketmaker's behavior and the major inputs to his or her decision-making
process.
At the risk of sounding ungrateful, let me point out the only two significant
shortcomings of the data set. First, there is, as I understand it, no listing of
intradaily news announcements to accompany the marketmaker's data. Such
data would have been available, for example, from the Reuters financial news-
wire—indeed, they may still exist in a Reuters archive—and would have al-
lowed analysis of the marketmaker's response to such events. Second, the data
are limited to a single marketmaker. I must acknowledge that it is almost in-
conceivable that anyone could get access to such data for multiple marketmak-
ers simultaneously. Nonetheless, this is a limitation for two reasons. First, as
Lyons acknowledges, we cannot be sure that the marketmaker observed here
is representative. It is reasonable to suppose that different marketmakers have
different strengths, weaknesses, and constraints and that, therefore, they will
have different trading strategies. Second, there are interesting characteristics
of the microstructure, including especially the alleged hot potato phenomenon,
that best reveal themselves in the interaction of marketmakers rather than the
isolated behavior of an individual.
I turn now to the theory that Lyons uses to motivate and derive the central
empirical hypotheses of the paper, the hot potato and event-uncertainty hypoth-
eses. I suggest an avenue for improving the model as a representation of a
foreign exchange marketmaker, as distinguished from a stock exchange spe-
cialist. Let me emphasize that what follows is intended as a suggestion for
future research rather than an indictment of the present paper. Lyons is aware
of the issues raised here and addresses most of them in the paper or in the
companion piece, Lyons (1995), which is recommended to readers of the pres-
ent paper. I found that many of my questions about the latter were answered
by reference to the former.
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The theoretical model used here is taken essentially unaltered from Madha-
van and Smidt (1991). They are modeling a stock exchange specialist facing a
"trader," potentially with inside information. We can reason that the Madhavan
and Smidt analysis cannot be a fully accurate model of the foreign exchange
market. I shall use Lyons's equation (6), which defines the marketmaker's
transaction prices, to focus my explanation of why this is so:
Pit = M,, + a(/, - /J) + yDit,
or, substituting,
Equation (6) divides the marketmaker's transaction price into three additive
factors: (1) there is a baseline estimate, |x.?, of the intrinsic value of the foreign
currency, stated as a convex combination of two signals, one public (S)
and one private (C/f); (2) there is a technical "inventory-shading" adjustment,
a(/.r - /*), to this baseline estimate; and (3) there is a second technical adjust-
ment for the bid-ask spread, yDit. In this model, all informational innovations
are impounded in the first term.
This arrangement reflects the intellectual lineage of the theory. In traditional
microstructural models going back at least as far as Stigler (1964) and his
"jobber's turn" or Demsetz (1968), the (monopolistic) marketmaker—by
definition one who stands ready to quote prices and transact on demand—
provides liquidity services. The marketmaker, typically conceived as a stock
exchange specialist, quotes a market-clearing price (or, under uncertainty, her
best estimate of the market-clearing price) and is compensated through the
bid-ask spread for her service: waiting around with a securities inventory and
trading with all comers. Because she quotes a market-clearing price, she accu-
mulates no inventory (on average). In the later "adverse selection" models, the
marketmaker must also be compensated for risk bearing since some traders
will come to the marketmaker with profitable insider information, a situation
that the marketmaker cannot avoid and therefore must insure against via a
wider bid-ask spread.
The reason that this cannot accurately represent a foreign exchange mar-
ketmaker is that foreign exchange marketmakers cannot base their quoted
prices on an estimate of the market-clearing price. Foreign exchange mar-
ketmakers are surrounded by competing marketmakers, all of whom have the
resources to exploit arbitrage opportunities. This produces an imperative of
arbitrage avoidance. Marketmakers who would quote off-market prices (i.e., a
bid-ask spread that does not overlap with the spreads prevailing elsewhere in
the market) are extremely likely to find themselves with a large inventory that
could have been had at a better price. Thus, marketmakers must attempt to
keep their quotes consistent with those of all other marketmakers.
For this reason, the determination of prices in equation (6) should be domi-
nated by price information. It is instructive to consider the following counterar-204 Richard K. Lyons
gument: that the model does not specify the exact nature of the signals (Sr
and Cit) and that these therefore need not include nonprice information at all;
therefore, the model indeed allows for marketmakers' behavior that is domi-
nated by price information. There are two significant flaws with such an
argument.
First, even if [i,.f is determined only by price information, the arbitrage avoid-
ance rule will still be violated if the inventory discrepancy (/., - /*) is suffi-
ciently large. The problem is therefore with the functional form of equation
(6) rather than simply the interpretation given to Sr and Cit. Lyons is aware of
this concern: Lyons (1995) estimates the coefficient a and calculates the size
of an inventory discrepancy required for the inventory shading adjustment in
equation (6) to overwhelm the bid-ask spread: roughly $40 million. In fact, the
marketmaker whose behavior is measured here seldom has an inventory in
excess of $40 million (see Lyons 1995, fig. 3). This fact reduces the status of
my criticism here from an indictment to a quibble.
Second, and more fundamentally, behavior that considers only price infor-
mation under an arbitrage avoidance rule leaves the exchange rate indetermi-
nate: any price consensus will avoid arbitrage. While this would be consistent
with the herd behavior (e.g., speculative bubbles) that some researchers believe
characterizes certain exchange rate episodes, a very heavy burden of proof
must be placed on anyone who would argue that marketmaker behavior ignores
nonprice information.
Positing that marketmaker pricing is dominated by price information does
not imply, of course, that marketmakers ignore or even discount nonprice infor-
mation. The desired inventory position represents the other main element of
the marketmaker's strategy. To the extent that the current market consensus
price fails to reflect all the marketmaker's (nonprice) information, this discrep-
ancy should be exploited through speculative position taking. Borrowing a bit
of monetary policy jargon, there are two targets (arbitrage avoidance and spec-
ulative profits) and two policy instruments (price and inventory). /* is thus a
measure of the extent to which the marketmaker believes that the market price
misestimates the value of the foreign currency. Unfortunately, in the Madhavan
and Smidt model, /* is a constant. Although Lyons offers a technique for mak-
ing /* depend on information (see his section 1.4), this approach requires that
public information (St) be limited to price information. Moreover, this ap-
proach is not incorporated elsewhere in the paper.
Representing a separate role for nonprice information ultimately requires
that one distinguish between price and nonprice signals in the notation of the
model. If we achieve this with superscripts, then equation (6) can be rewrit-
ten as
There are three differences in this proposed reformulation: (1) the baseline
estimate, \xit, is a function only of price signals, Sf and C
pit; (2) inventory shad-205 Foreign Exchange Volume
ing is allowed, but now as a nonlinear function of both \xjt and the inventory
discrepancy, to incorporate the arbitrage avoidance rule; and (3) desired inven-
tory is a function of the nonprice signals, S"
p and Cf, as well as the baseline
estimate, \xjt. This, of course, is a reformulation of a single equation in a larger
model. While rederiving the model to address the concerns raised here is a
nontrivial assignment, such a derivation would represent an important advance
in our theoretical understanding of decentralized, multiple-dealer markets such
as the foreign exchange market.
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Comment Antonio Mello
This paper is a case study of the motives for trading foreign exchange currency.
The author tests two hypotheses: either trading is generated by inventory rea-
sons, and in that case it does not convey information when time between con-
secutive trades is short, or, alternatively, trading is generated by the arrival
of new information and intense trading means that an information event has
occurred. Using direct quotes and trades from a dealer, covering the five trad-
ing days of a particular week in the summer of 1992, the author concludes that
both motives can explain trading.
The strength and originality of the study results from the data set used. It
shows how important it is, in doing work on high-frequency data, to use the
correct transaction series. Indeed, data can significantly affect the results as
well as our understanding of the economic phenomena. In this respect, the
analysis of the behavior of a particular dealer is very informative and certainly
improves our knowledge. However, having established that directly reported
real-time transactions data are best to test a particular hypothesis (against an-
other), one needs not only to spend more time with the same dealer—that is,
having not just one week, but several weeks, and especially different event
weeks (turbulent vs. calm periods)—but also to collect data from a panel of
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different dealers, to control for differences in preferences, in size, in capital,
and in information.
The two views of trading intensity analyzed, the event-uncertainty view and
the hot potato view, deserve some comment. First, I find it difficult to justify
the hot potato view: either a dealer is at the optimal inventory level, or he is
not. If he is, then he must be indifferent, on a risk-adjusted basis, to trade and
not to trade, and the quotes from trading with a liquidity trader must reflect the
fact that he must be compensated, on average, for deviating from an optimal
inventory level. This makes the trade movement in one direction neither neces-
sary nor optimal. So it does not when the dealer's inventory is not at the optimal
level. Perhaps what is really happening is that the dealer is frequently trading
to rebalance his optimal inventory level. This would be consistent with a model
that accounts for changes in the desired level of inventory. If the relative price
of currencies changes, then optimal inventory composition should also change,
as the opportunity cost of holding different currencies changes. This should
happen regardless of the length of period analyzed, although in practice the
revisions of the desired positions should occur only at discrete and endogenous
intervals. This more general formulation is certainly difficult to test, but it is
also a more realistic one. It requires nonlinear estimation methods, and the
interpretation of the results is surely more complex.
Second, the tests are based on the sensitivity of price changes to the order
flow, which can be interpreted as a test of market depth. In that case, as the
time interval shortens, on average, one expects the price changes to be smaller,
which is exactly the result the author obtains. Indeed, the feeling that I have is
that the results seem to be highly dependent on the definition of short time, a
metric that must be endogenous and dependent on the prevailing market condi-
tions.
Third, to test a particular theory, it is not sufficient to show whether a partic-
ular coefficient is significant and has the right sign. It is also necessary to look
at other coefficients and to show that the estimated model displays good adher-
ence to the data.
Finally, in testing and interpreting the results, it is important to consider the
fact that price improvement is discrete. Depending on the relevance of this
matter, OLS may not be appropriate. Also, if prices change discretely, it may
very well be the case that prices are revised only after %Q, and the interpreta-
tion of the results in the tables changes accordingly.
Although there are some points that deserve attention and must be tightened,
overall I think that this paper is a contribution in the right direction, and there-
fore it must be welcomed.TT Speculation, Exchange Rate
Crises, and Macroeconomic
Fundamentals